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Go South! India “Discovers”  
Africa and Latin America
Sandra Destradi and Eva Küssner
In August 2012, India’s first dialogue with the Community of Latin American and Ca-
ribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, CELAC), found-
ed in 2010, took place in New Delhi. Following India’s “rediscovery” of Africa, this 
demonstrated India’s interest in forging closer political ties with Latin America.
Analysis
Since the 1990s, India has been globalizing its foreign policy. Having initially focused 
on Southeast and East Asia, India has looked to extend its relationships with Africa 
and Latin America in recent years. The driving force behind India’s diversification of 
foreign policy to the global South is, on the one hand, economic interests, and, on the 
 other, the quest for recognition of India’s ascent to great power status.
  India’s renewed engagement in Africa began with Indian businesses’ investments 
in the raw material sector. Through a number of development activities and with 
the participation of Indian soldiers in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping opera-
tions, the Indian government has been signaling to the international community its 
readiness to act as a responsible (potential) great power. Security policy interests 
are the reason for different kinds of security cooperation with East African states in 
the Indian Ocean region – an area India considers to be part of its extended region-
al neighborhood.
  Indian-owned businesses have become increasingly active in Latin America since 
the beginning of the twenty-first century. This is, however, not only due to the re-
gion’s resource wealth, but also to its potential as a market for Indian products and 
as an investment location. Foreign policy has only recently started to follow the 
economy, as shown by New Delhi’s hosting of the India-CELAC Foreign Ministers’ 
Dialogue in 2012.
  India remains, however, far behind China. Despite India’s growing engagement in 
Africa and Latin America, these regions are not of primary importance in the overall 
context of Indian foreign policy, which is still very much focused on security threats 
that spill over from the immediate regional vicinity. 
Keywords: India, Africa, Latin America, foreign policy
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Global Reorientation of Indian Foreign Policy 
For more than a decade, India has been consid-
ered an emerging great power. Average growth 
rates of 8.4 percent from 2006/2007 to 2010/2011 
and a booming IT sector show India to be a new 
economic power, often compared to China. In-
dia’s economic boom has been accompanied by 
a growing effort by New Delhi to be recognized 
by and, ultimately, accepted into the “club” of the 
great powers in international politics. Despite cur-
rently declining growth rates, this trend has con-
tinued, leading to a foreign policy that is increas-
ingly globally oriented. 
Although India’s foreign policy priorities in the 
1980s were still very much limited to South Asia, 
following economic liberalization in the 1990s, In-
dia has expanded its focus. The so-called “Look 
East” policy – started during the tenure of Prime 
Minister Narasimha Rao (1991–1996) – saw in-
creasingly closer relations developed with South-
east and East Asian countries. The driving force 
behind this new orientation of Indian foreign pol-
icy was primarily economic interests, since New 
Delhi hoped to benefit from improved ties with 
the flourishing economies of the Asian Tigers. 
Furthermore, India had to reshape its foreign pol-
icy globally following the end of the Cold War and 
the dissolution of its longstanding partner, the So-
viet Union. Since the beginning of the twenty-first 
century this has led to a decidedly “pragmatic” 
foreign policy. For instance, India has partly con-
tinued its Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) rheto-
ric by reiterating its preference for the principles 
of non-intervention and sovereignty as well as a 
“values-driven” foreign policy. At the same time, 
however, the Indian government has systematical-
ly endeavored to diversify its international part-
nerships. Thus, on the one hand, India has contin-
ued to cultivate its existing relationship with Rus-
sia – India’s most important weapons supplier – 
and, on the other hand, it sought to get closer to 
the United States for the first time, despite major 
internal opposition. The culmination of these pro-
cesses was the signing of the US–India Civil Nu-
clear Cooperation Agreement in 2008, which al-
lows India access to nuclear technology and ma-
terials, even though it has not signed the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. As regards Europe, the 
Indian government signed a strategic partnership 
agreement with the European Union in 2004 (Hess 
2013), while negotiations continue over a free trade 
agreement. India is also developing positive re-
lations with various Asian partners, including Ja-
pan and South Korea – with whom India signed 
strategic partnership agreements in 2006 and 2010, 
respectively – as well as the resource-rich Central 
Asian states. In the Middle East, the desire for co-
operation with all relevant partners goes so far that 
India maintains good relations with not  only Isra-
el, but also Iran and some Arab states – an ambiv-
alent and not always unproblematic policy (Berger 
and Mattes 2008). 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first centu-
ry, moreover, India has been increasingly coop-
erating with other emerging powers – in particu-
lar with Brazil, South Africa, and China – in differ-
ent constellations, depending on the subject  area 
and commonalities in interests (Flemes, Scholvin, 
and Strüver 2011). Cooperative frameworks in-
clude the IBSA Dialogue Forum (founded in 2003), 
in which India cooperates closely with Brazil and 
South Africa as a tripartite grouping of the largest 
democracies in the global South; the annual BRICS 
summit (inaugurated in 2009) which is used by the 
BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) to coordinate their demands – for 
example, the restructuring of the world financial 
system; and the so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, 
South Africa, India, and China) which agreed to 
joint action at the 2009 UN Climate Change Con-
ference in Copenhagen.
In sum, India’s foreign policy is characterized 
by a willingness to cooperate with various inter-
national partners, without becoming too strongly 
bound to any particular partner or possibly enter-
ing into a relationship of dependency. Therefore, 
despite attempting to develop stronger relations 
with the US, India was not willing, for example, 
to follow the US on issues like the sanctions poli-
cy against Iran. The central objective of this diver-
sified and pragmatic foreign policy is to obtain in-
ternational recognition of India’s status as a great 
power. This effort – which is expressed most clear-
ly in the call for reform of the UN Security Council 
and, in particular, for a permanent seat for India 
– is not new, but it has received new impetus due 
to India’s economic rise in recent years. Econom-
ic interests and the quest for international recogni-
tion are the driving forces behind the expansion of 
India’s foreign policy priorities towards two oth-
er regions of the global South: Africa and Latin 
America. The following sections will address the 
motivations and interests of this additional orien-
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tation to the South as well as the results, to date, of 
India’s Africa and Latin America policy.
Enhanced Cooperation in Africa
India’s relations with Africa had remained stag-
nant for a long time despite the richness of its his-
torical links with the region. Trade relations have 
existed between the Indian subcontinent and Af-
rica since the ninth century, while British colonial 
rule led to the arrival of the Indian diaspora in 
East Africa. After independence, India supported 
African decolonization in the UN, closely cooper-
ated with various African states in the framework 
of the NAM, and has long acted as a donor, pro-
viding technical support to Africa since the 1970s. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, however, relations re-
mained at a relatively low level until New Delhi’s 
global orientation of foreign and economic poli-
cies and subsequent renewed interest in Africa. 
India’s “rediscovery” of Africa was driven pri-
marily by economic interests. Due to its own scar-
city of resources and growing energy use, India 
is reliant on the diversification of its energy im-
ports. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the In-
dian government is trying to establish oil produc-
tion agreements in countries such as Nigeria, An-
gola, and Sudan. The agreements are often linked 
to the allocation of funds or to the implementa-
tion of development projects (aid for oil). In Nige-
ria, for example, the Oil and Natural Gas Corpo-
ration (ONGC)–Mittal Investment consortium in-
vested 6 billion USD in the rights for oil produc-
tion in 2006. In return, the consortium built an oil 
refinery, a power plant, and a railway line. Similar 
agreements can be found in other sectors. For in-
stance, an Indian consortium invested 1.2 billion 
USD in the mining of diamonds in Zimbabwe. In 
return for a continual supply of diamonds, a train-
ing program in diamond processing was to be es-
tablished for young Zimbabweans (Vines 2010: 
4–5). The uranium reserves of countries like Na-
mibia and Malawi, moreover, are of particular in-
terest for India’s nuclear program. 
Africa offers not only access to raw materials, 
but also a market for Indian products. In order to 
promote Indian exports, the government launched 
its “Focus Africa”  program in 2002, which pro-
vides for the granting of credit by the EXIM Bank 
among other things. In fact, over the past decade 
India’s trade with African states has grown rapid-
ly: from 3 billion USD in 2000 to almost 53 billion 
USD in 2010/2011 (Ramachandran 2012). Never-
theless, within the context of its economic activ-
ities in Africa – as in most other regions – India is 
lagging far behind China. On the one hand, New 
Delhi strives to imitate China’s success. For ex-
ample, its India–Africa Forum Summit meetings, 
which took place in 2008 and 2011, replicate the 
longer existing Forum on China–Africa Coopera-
tion, albeit within a smaller scope. On the other 
hand, Indian government officials stress the radi-
cal differences between India’s engagement in Af-
rica and that of China. They argue that India is not 
only concerned with the extraction of natural re-
sources, but also with the creation of added value 
for African economies and, ultimately, for the Af-
rican people (Vines 2011). 
The desire to compete and keep up with China 
– in Africa and beyond – represents a driving force 
in its own right in Indian foreign policy. In recent 
years, China has expanded its influence in India’s 
neighborhood, including countries such as Nepal 
and Sri Lanka – a region which India perceives to 
be its traditional sphere of influence. With the con-
struction of a number of ports in Pakistan, Sri Lan-
ka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, China has substan-
tially increased its presence in the Indian Ocean 
(Pant 2012). This situation – along with the necessi-
ty to safeguard trade routes from pirate attacks – ac-
counts for India’s growing security policy engage-
ment in East Africa. In recent years, for example, In-
dia has finalized defense agreements with a num-
ber of East African states, including Mozambique, 
Madagascar and the Seychelles (Vines 2010: 9). In 
Madagascar, India erected a radar monitoring sta-
tion in order to better police the waters off the Af-
rican east coast (Vines 2010: 9). Also, as part of a 
defense agreement signed in 2000, there is regular 
contact between the Indian and South African na-
vies (Sidiropoulos 2011: 8).
Apart from concrete economic and security in-
terests, New Delhi’s Africa policy is also driven by 
the overriding desire to be recognized as a great 
power. Therefore, India has tried to distinguish 
itself in the eyes of the international community 
as a responsible actor, providing public goods in 
Africa. India has always been one of the most ac-
tive participants in UN peacekeeping operations, 
and currently has around 8,000 soldiers assigned 
to such missions in Africa. Additionally, India 
has increased its development policy engagement 
in Africa in recent years. Besides the aforemen-
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tioned export-promoting and conditions-bound 
measures, India offers training – from IT to lan-
guages to management courses – to approximate-
ly 3,000 people from various African states each 
year through the Indian Technical and Econom-
ic Cooperation (ITEC) program. New Delhi also 
plans to set up 19 new training institutes in tri-
lateral cooperation with individual African states 
and the African Union. Moreover, with the Pan-
African e-Network Project, India has invested 117 
million USD in the networking of schools and hos-
pitals and in the provision of e-governance and e-
commerce services for African countries.
Critical Voices from Africa
As far as its development activities are concerned, 
India avoids short-term projects due to its own ex-
periences with such projects carried out by West-
ern donor countries. Through its programs, India 
is showing the international community that its 
status has risen from development aid recipient to 
that of a donor. At the same time India’s engage-
ment in African countries is strongly influenced 
by the rhetoric of “South-South cooperation,” 
which emphasizes a “partnership of equals,” un-
like the classical donor-recipient relationship. In-
dia thus seeks to gain favor with African countries 
and, at the same time, to gain supporters in the 
UN General Assembly for a possible vote on UN 
Security Council reform, which requires a two-
thirds majority. Although it is often argued that 
compared to China, India is perceived as a less 
aggressive and more cooperative partner in Afri-
ca (Taylor 2012: 795), India’s engagement in Afri-
ca is not entirely uncontroversial. In certain East 
African countries, the local communities have ex-
pressed resentment toward the Indian diaspora 
(Taylor 2012: 782) and Indian development coop-
eration projects, such as the construction of a pres-
idential palace in Accra, Ghana, have been heav-
ily criticized. The participation of Indian soldiers 
in UN peacekeeping operations has also occasion-
ally created tensions. In 2008, for example, Indian 
troops were accused of corruption, sexual assault, 
and the failure to protect civilians, leading the 
government of the Democratic Republic of Con-
go to demand their exclusion from the operation.
Although India has, in recent years, placed con-
siderable emphasis on developing relations with 
Africa, a coherent policy towards the region has 
not yet been established. India has generally strug-
gled to set clear foreign policy priorities (Maihack 
and Plagemann 2013), often following a reactive 
policy characterized by selective and ad hoc deci-
sions. On the one hand, this is related to the con-
straints placed upon Indian diplomacy – in par-
ticular to the dramatic understaffing of the Indi-
an Ministry of External Affairs. On the other hand, 
the lack of coordination and the competing inter-
ests of different stakeholders – from the private 
sector to those in institutions entrusted with devel-
opment policy to the security establishment –  also 
play a role in influencing Indian policy towards 
Africa (Taylor 2012: 796).
Economic Development in Latin America 
Latin America is the last region to which the Indi-
an government has opened up its foreign policy. 
It is also geographically the most distant region 
and – from a historical perspective – one of the re-
gions with which India has had the least contact. 
India’s membership in the NAM and the Com-
monwealth, on the one hand, and Latin American 
countries’ cooperation in their own regional orga-
nizations, on the other, meant that India and Lat-
in America belonged to two different “clubs” in 
international politics (Heine 2012: 5). India’s rela-
tions with Latin America are, therefore, primarily 
driven by the economy, where improved access to 
natural resources and raw materials plays a signif-
icant role not too dissimilar to that in India’s eco-
nomic relations with Africa. 
Latin America’s deposits of mineral resources 
such as copper, iron ore, tin, and lithium as well as 
coal and oil are extremely attractive to India. Cur-
rently, commodities and commodity-based prod-
ucts account for about 50 percent of Latin Ameri-
ca’s exports to India (OECD and ECLAC 2011: 21). 
Furthermore, the importation of agricultural prod-
ucts – including soy products from countries such 
as Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay – might help 
supply the growing Indian population in the lon-
ger term. At the same time, India sees Latin Amer-
ica as an attractive market for Indian goods: Bra-
zil, Colombia, and Mexico import vehicles, chem-
icals, consumer goods, and, above all, intermedi-
ate goods from India. Brazil, for instance, was the 
second largest importer of Indian textiles and in-
secticides between 2008 and 2010, while Colombia 
imported the second largest amount of scooters 
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from India worldwide (ECLAC 2011: 49). In recent 
years, Indian companies have entered Latin Amer-
ica with large scale projects in the resources sec-
tor. For example, ONGC Videsh bought 15 percent 
of Brazil’s oil fields at auction in 2006. In 2007, the 
Jindal Steel and Power Group invested 2.1 billion 
USD in the mining of iron ore in Bolivia’s Mutún 
mine and another 600 million USD in 2012, which 
saw the Jindal Group become the largest Indian 
investor in Latin America (Economic Times 2012). 
Essar Oil, a subsidiary of India’s Essar Group, has 
agreements in place with most Latin American 
countries to extract heavy oil and bought more 
than 10 million tons of crude oil from Venezue-
la, Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Ecuador in 2012. 
Meanwhile, Arcelor Mittal has steel plants in Mex-
ico, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, and Brazil. 
The direct investments of Indian companies, 
however, go far beyond the resources sector. The 
first Indian company active in Latin America was 
the IT services and outsourcing company Tata 
Consultancy Services (TCS), in 2002. From its first 
location in Uruguay, TCS has expanded to 14 Lat-
in American countries, where it employs a total of 
5,000 employees (TCS 2013). At 9.2 percent growth 
in 2011, the IT market in Latin America is one of 
the fastest growing IT markets in the world, mak-
ing it very attractive for Indian companies.
Of the 40,000 employees in Latin American 
subsidiaries of Indian companies, about half are 
employed in the IT sector. Also, Indian pharma-
ceutical companies like Ranbaxy, which entered 
the Latin America market as a joint venture in 
2000, have since established wholly owned sub-
sidiaries in the Latin American market. 
Intensification of Political Relations with  
Latin America
Although economic relations with Latin America 
have been in place for over a decade, this region 
was long ignored by Indian politics. However, In-
dia maintains particularly close political ties with 
Brazil, in part through its networking in interna-
tional forums such as IBSA and BRICS (Heine 2009: 
130–132). This was particularly the case under 
President Lula da Silva (2003–2011), which saw 
the intensification of bilateral ties as well as three 
presidential visits to India during his eight-year 
tenure. However, New Delhi had little interest in 
other Latin American countries for a long peri-
od.  Only recently has policy started to follow the 
economy: In August 2012, the Indian government 
initiated interaction with the Community of Lat-
in American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de 
Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, CELAC) 
by hosting the first India-CELAC Foreign Min-
isters’ Dialogue in an attempt to bring new mo-
mentum to India’s relations with Latin America. 
In addition to the decision to promote closer eco-
nomic cooperation, a number of policy-relevant 
issues were discussed at the event, ranging from 
the fight against terrorism to the use of renewable 
energy. Meanwhile, both sides confirmed their in-
terest in scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges, 
and tourism development (MEA 2012b). Although 
the India-CELAC meeting barely went beyond 
the expression of interest in working more close-
ly together, this was the first attempt by the Indi-
an government to cooperate with a Latin Amer-
ican organization representing the entire region. 
At the bilateral level, India’s increased interests in 
Latin American countries and growing exchang-
es with Latin American governments were reflect-
ed in the number of state visits, which rose from 
 only 12 visits during 1947–2000 to 12 during 2001–
2011. For several years, India has also conducted 
small-scale development projects in various Latin 
American countries; however, only 0.01 percent of 
India’s total development cooperation flowed into 
Latin America in 2011/2012 (MEA 2012a).
Despite the significant intensification of Indi-
an relations with Latin America, it must be noted 
that these still remain at a very low level. Despite 
the strengthening of trade relations, in 2011/2012 
 only 4.4 percent of India’s total exports went to 
Latin America, and only 2.4 percent of total Indi-
an imports came from that region (RBI 2012). As in 
Africa, China is also a step ahead of India in Lat-
in America, and has not only long maintained eco-
nomic relations with Latin American countries, 
but has also expanded its political influence in the 
region and has established a number of strategic 
partnerships (Soliz Landivar and Scholvin 2011).
Unlike China, India barely has the necessary 
resources to expand its foreign policy engagement 
in Latin America (Heine 2012: 6). According to the 
2011/2012 annual report issued by the Ministry 
of External Affairs, only 64 Indian diplomats had 
Spanish-language skills, while only 18 had Portu-
guese-language skills. In India’s think tanks there 
are no specific departments that deal with the Lat-
in American region, while there is also an absence 
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of Latin American study programs at Indian uni-
versities, meaning that knowledge and under-
standing of this region remains limited in India. 
At the same time, this low level of previous con-
tact could also be a good basis for the longer-term 
development of political cooperation. Unlike in 
some African and neighboring South Asian coun-
tries, there are no past animosities that might im-
pede the opportunity to build stable political re-
lations.
Asia Remains Foreign-Policy Focus despite 
Global Orientation
India’s “rediscovery” of Africa, its “discovery” of 
Latin America and the associated expansion of In-
dia’s foreign policy towards the South reveal its 
increasingly global nature. Because of different 
historical conditions and geopolitical realities, In-
dia’s involvement in Africa is significantly more 
advanced than it is in Latin America. Despite ex-
isting historical ties to Africa, however, the crucial 
factor for the strengthening of relations was the 
Indian economy’s interest in the region. Politics 
followed and this, in turn, provided an improved 
framework for closer economic ties. In its relations 
with Africa, the Indian government used its par-
ticipation in UN peacekeeping operations and its 
allocation of development aid as a way to distin-
guish itself at the international level and gain po-
tential supporters among African states. In the 
case of Latin America, political relations are, how-
ever, only in an embryonic stage, with economic 
considerations still very much at the forefront of 
New Delhi’s interests.
Although there is a lot of potential in India’s 
relations with Africa and Latin America, and even 
though New Delhi has made significant efforts 
and clear progress in the development of its Af-
rica and Latin America policy in recent years, the 
importance of these regions in the overall picture 
of Indian priorities should not be overestimated. 
While Africa is clearly relevant mainly because 
of security policy implications for India and Af-
rica’s east coast is seen as part of India’s “extend-
ed neighborhood,” Latin America is (with the ex-
ception of Brazil), in political terms, of second-
ary importance for India. India is faced with more 
pressing issues in its own region: primarily with 
its nuclear-armed, politically unstable long-term 
rival Pakistan; with the conflict hotspot Afghani-
stan, from which the Western powers are current-
ly withdrawing; and with its regional and supra-
regional competitor China (Destradi and Mokry 
2011). Nonetheless, India’s engagement in “the 
South” – the growing acceptance of responsibility 
in Africa and the intensification of relations with 
Latin America – represents an important building 
block in India’s path to becoming a great power.
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